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Abstract 
In this paper, we explore deception in its various guises. We identify the difference 
between lies and deception, and highlight the consideration of medium and message 
in both deception and its detection. We envisage a Web Filter for deception which 
could be used equally well as an assistive service for human readers, and as a 
mechanism for a system that learns from the web. To this end, we also explore 
whether the research appears to be sufficient to allow for the construction of such a 
filter.  
1 Introduction 
Suppose we wished to create an intelligent machine, and the web was the choice of 
information. More specifically, suppose we relied on Wikipedia as a resource from 
which this intelligent machine would derive its knowledge base. Any acts of 
Wikipedia vandalism, as being explored in an international workshop (PAN 2011) 
amongst other places, would impact upon the knowledge base of this intelligent 
system, and the system might develop confidence in entirely incorrect information. 
Ethically, should we develop a machine which can craft its own knowledge base 
without reference to the veracity of the material it considers? If we did, what kinds of 
“beliefs” might such a machine start to encompass and would these be acceptable? 
How might a learning machine distinguish between generally agreed positions, those 
over which there were debate, and those in which there were deceptions and lies? 
What kinds of conclusions might be derived about our world as a consequence of 
addressing such questions? If trying to construct an ethical machine, how appropriate 
can ethical outcomes be considered in the presence of deceptive data? And, finally, 
how much of the Web might be deemed deceptive? 
In this paper, we investigate the nature and, importantly the detectability, of deception 
at large, and in relation to the web. Deception appears to be increasingly prevalent in 
society, whether deliberate, accidental, or simply ill-informed. Examples of deception 
are readily available, from individuals deceiving potential partners on dating websites, 
to surveys which make headlines about “Coffee causing Hallucinations” with no 
medical evidence and very little scientific rigour (BBC, 2009), to companies which 
collapsed due to allegedly deceptive financial practices (e.g. Enron, WorldCom), and 
segments of the financial industry allegedly misrepresenting risk in order to derive 
substantial profits (Telegraph, 2010). We envisage a Web Filter which could be used 
equally well as an assistive service for human readers, and as a mechanism within a 
system that learns from the web, and are concerned with whether relevant literature 
presents a suitably computable basis for such a system. In section 2, we define 
deception as something intentional and more broad than lying; section 3 looks at 
various key features of deception and gears towards the detection of deception. 
Section 4 provides a brief view of the relationship between deception and ethics, and 
offers a few examples characterised with respect to both. In section 5, we attempt to 
adopt some existing approaches to deception detection, with varying successes. 
Finally, we highlight related questions about deception detection and the possibilities 
for such a system. 
2 Defining deception 
Like it or not, deception is a reasonably common part of daily life. Society sometimes 
demonstrates a level of acceptance of it, and occasionally even seeks to be deceived. 
Most sociologists believe that people engage in deceptive behaviour in order to avoid 
tension and conflicts, manage impressions, and minimize negative feelings (Goffman, 
1959; Lippard, 1988, Metts, 1989). DePaulo et al. (1996) argues that deception in 
everyday life is less about pursuit of goals such as financial gain and material 
advantage and more about pursuit of rewards such as esteem, affection and respect. 
As a result, she believes that lies we hear everyday are more often regarding feeling, 
preferences and opinions. But what do we understand by deception? Mahon (2007) 
defines deceiving as: 
“To intentionally cause another person to have or continue to have a false 
belief that is truly believed to be false by the person intentionally causing the 
false belief by bringing about evidence on the basis of which the other person 
has or continues to have that false belief.” 
Here, deception is an intentional act, which distinguishes it from simply being ill-
informed: a person deceived may well have false beliefs but lack awareness of the 
falsehood. If they broadcast that falsehood, they cannot really be perceived as 
deceptive people. So, believing the Earth to be flat and the Sun to rotate it, may well 
have been the case at a particular historical juncture, but there was not necessarily an 
intention to deceive. 
So, when we use the term deception do we simply mean lie? Many researchers use 
both terms interchangeably, such as Mahon (2007), Vrij (2000) and Ekman (1988). 
However, if we consider a definition such as: 
“A lie is a statement, believed by the liar to be false, made to another person 
with the intention that the person be deceived by the statement (Bok, 1978).” 
we must characterise lies as a specialised form of deception which may exist alone, or 
which may be accompanied by other actions and behaviours that might be in 
agreement with the lies by being deceptive themselves, or, likely, in disagreement. 
Essentially, a lie is “told”, whilst deceptions can occur without requiring such 
verbalisation – as we will explore later in this paper. 
A basic classification of lies has been proposed by Erat & Gneezy (2009), defining 4 
types based on their consequences (Figure 1). 
1. "Selfish black lies" increase the player’s payoff but decrease the others payoff 
2. "Spite black lies" decrease both sides’ payoffs. 
3. "Pareto white lies" increase both sides’ payoffs. 
4. "Altruistic white lies" increase the others payoff but are costly to the deceiver 
Whilst we have suggested lying as a specialisation of deception, we could also 
generalise (Figure 1) to deception, with similar payoffs.  
 Figure 1: Taxonomy of Lies Based on Change in Payoffs 
The above figure may also be related to the degree to which deceptive behaviour is 
planned. The most harmful deceits– those that can in lower half of the figure – are 
those where prior thinking is more likely to be required, as well as some level of 
preparation. By contrast, actions with little or no negative consequences for receivers 
– white lies – are more likely spontaneous. Researchers are not necessarily in 
agreement over such a characterisation (see, for example, Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 
1984; Lindskold & Walters, 1983; Hample, 1980). 
3 Dimensions of deception 
The nature of deception has encouraged study by psychologists, sociologists, 
criminologists, philosophers and anthropologists over many for centuries. “A History 
of Lie Detection”, Trovillo (1939), covers different methods of detecting deception 
from African witchcraft to invention of polygraphs which dates the importance of 
recognising cues of deception as far as 900 B.C.  
In this section, we provide a brief overview of research into deception and its 
detection, covering various studies into aspects of communication and occasionally 
identifying variations in interpretations which may be awkward to reconcile. 
3.1 Medium 
Different mediums are used for different sorts of communication, with variations in 
the nature of interaction, capabilities for feedback, number of available channels, 
language variety, and so on. “media richness” can be used to refer to a medium which 
can offer scope for larger numbers of potentially deceptive cues. The medium can be 
characterised by (Hancock, Thom-Santelli & Ritchie, 2004): 
• Synchronicity: extent of real-time communication. 
• Distribution: degree of physical co-location. 
• Recordability: extent to which the medium is automatically recordable. 
Based on these elements, a rich medium is more “synchronous, concentrated and non-
recordable”, and so face-to- face interactions offer a rich medium, while numeric 
documents offer less richness (Daft & Lengel, 1986; Daft & Wiginton, 1979). 
Using such characteristics, researchers have tried to highlight preferable mediums for 
deception in Media Richness Theory (MRT, Daft & Lengel, 1984), Social Presence 
Theory (SPT, Short et al. 1976), Social Distance Theory (SDT, DePaulo et. al. 1996), 
Feature Based Model (FBM, Hancock, Thom-Santelli & Ritchie, 2004), and Channel 
Expansion Theory (CET, Carlson and Zmud, 1994 and 1999). According to MRT and 
SPT, richer mediums should be preferred for deceptive behaviour, so face-to-face 
communication has more potential to contain deception than emails. However, 
according to SDT deceivers will prefer emails to face-to-face communication as 
deceivers will feel uncomfortable during the deception. In FBM, most deception 
emerges in synchronous, concentrated and non-recordable media, so telephones are 
preferred to instant messaging and face-to-face interaction, while emails are less 
preferable. CET highlights familiarity with the medium, topic of communication, 
environment, and many more elements, as changing the richness of the medium which 
can affect the choicee for deceptive behaviour. In short, the medium may not be a 
good predictor for deception, and these researchers may have come to various 
conclusions depending on the nature of analysis undertaken. Clearly there is scope for 
more comprehensive research here.  
3.2 Deception in the 3 Vs 
Telling a lie or being engaged in a deceptive behaviour is reported to be mentally, 
emotionally and physically more challenging than being truthful (Miller & Stiff, 
1993; Zuckerman et al., 1981; Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 2001).  Cues for deception can 
be carried in communication, depending on the medium (see above) by any or all of 
the 3 Vs: 
• Visual (non-verbal): physical behaviour; reactions, movements. 
• Verbal: anything said or written.  
• Vocal: elements that accompany verbal communication.  
Visual 
“They [the movements of expression] reveal the thoughts and intentions of others 
more truly than do words, which may be falsified (Darwin, 1872, p 359)”. 
Ekman and Friesen (1969) define non-verbal behaviour as “Any movement or 
position of the face and/or the body” defining 3 body areas that participate in the 
information transfer regarding deception (Ekman, 1965): 
1. Body act: movements of body parts, particularly intensity and emotion. There is a 
cognitive challenge (or cognitive load ,Vrij et al. 2011, or complexity, Newman et al. 
2003), in controlling body language whilst deceiving, occasionally exemplified in 
people sitting on their hands to prevent hand gestures evidencing deception. 
2. Posture: taking up specific body positions. Researchers have developed lists of 
postures they believe to be indicative of deception (Mehrabian, 1971; Horvath et 
al.1994), suggesting that truth-tellers are more likely to lean forward, in a comfortable 
and open display. Deceivers will usually take defensive and frozen postures, such as 
leaning back and crossing their arms or legs. 
3. Face: movements of parts of the face or posing certain expresssions. Porter & ten 
Brinke (2008) have demonstrated that faking negative emotions is harder than faking 
positive emotions because eyebrows, mouth, and eye movements (eyelashes, blinks, 
eyeballs, etc) can leak cues, but it might be possible to control these (see 1), whilst 
pupillary size changes may be considered reliable as they are harder to control, 
although harder to see (Lubow and Fein, 1996). 
 
Most non-verbal cues appear to exist across cultures, such as changes blinking, facial 
micro expressions and body movements.  However, most non-verbal cues will be 
absent when the communicators are not physically or virtually co-located 
(distributed), but can be present in both synchronous and asynchronous 
communication, depending on the medium being used. 
Vocal Deception 
There are two main features of vocal deception: nature of voice, and the way the 
words are being said. Nature of voice refers to tone, vocal tension, and pitch because 
tension causes vocal cords to tighten resulting in such changes. When considering 
how words are said, focus is on characteristics such as speed, number of errors, 
pauses and length of them. But these changes may also be dependent on the context, 
so cues to vocal deception in interpersonal interactions will differ from cues to vocal 
deception formal interviews (Mann, Vrij & Bull, 2002), and may also vary according 
to the participants. 
Verbal Deception 
Verbal deception covers significant ground, and is our principal area of interest 
amongst the 3 Vs. In contrast to the language-independence of non-verbal cues, verbal 
cues have language-dependence with variations in lexical and grammatical 
combinations potentially offering up cues. When someone is engaged in verbal 
deception, language patterns will change. These may be accompanied by gestures 
(non-verbal elements) and vocal elements depending on the medium. 
Three main types of interaction are important: 
1. Spoken (in face-to-face, in audio & video records, in video & audio 
conferences, and so on) 
2. Written (in blogs, emails, testimonies, academic articles, and so on) 
3. Transcripts of spoken 
Spoken communication combines verbal cues with vocal (and non-verbal cues if the 
participants are face-to-face), either in parallel or as complementary (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1969). However, in a written context vocal and non-verbal cues are missing 
(Gupta & Skillicorn, 2006). To identify deception requires either comparisons 
amongst lexical and grammatical forms used by the same person in deceptive and 
non-deceptive communication, or analysing such forms across samples from different 
people. 
A number of researchers (Newman et al. 2003; Keila & Skillicorn, 2005b; Burgoon et 
al. 2008) have been investigating the lexical, syntactic, and meta-content features of 
verbal deception, classifying pattern changes by three main dimensions: (a) quantity 
(b) quality and (c) overall impression. Quantity changes relate to number of words 
being used; e.g. in a sentence, in a passage, and so on. Qualitative changes relate to 
lexical selection but still depend in part on the number of nouns, verbs, and sentences. 
Overall impression appears to relate to human judgement (DePaulo et al. 2003), but 
due to the subjective nature of such assessments we have decided to set aside such 
cues from our research and focus on those which are more readily measurable. 
Regarding quantity and quality, there are different perspectives with many overlaps 
that highlight the most important or frequently studied cues. Pennebaker’s approach 
has been adopted widely, and is based on style (word-by-word), accuracy, and 
flexibility, for both written and spoken text (such as: Newman et al. 2003; Toma & 
Hancock, 2010). Pennebaker characterizes deceptive behaviour on the frequency of 
four kinds of words in three main categories: 
1. Self-references: Use of first-person singular shows speaker-ownership of 
statements and presents a link between the reality and the speaker. Self awareness 
reportedly leads to honesty, which will increase the number of self references 
(Voraurer & Ross, 1999; Davis & Brock, 1975). Deceivers may use fewer self-
references to “distance” and “dissociate” themselves from the ownership of a 
statement (Knapp, Hart & Dennis, 1974), or because it is not a personal experience. 
2. Negative words: Emotions such as guilt, shame and fear can result in leakage of 
deception (Ekman, 1985/1992; Vrij, 2000). As most of these feelings are negative, 
this can lead to discomfort for the deceiver (DePaulo et al., 2003). The effect of these 
negative emotions is reported to increase the number of negative words in deceivers’ 
statement. 
3. Cognitive complexity: increased cognitive complexity/load occurs through (a) 
exclusive words and (b) motion/action verbs. Deceivers should use fewer “exclusive 
words” - such as except, but, without and exclude (Pennebaker & King, 1999). Fewer 
exclusive words leads to an increase in motion and actions verbs (e.g. go, lead, walk). 
DePaulo et al. (2003) offer a list of 158 cues. Of these, 25 cues, including response 
length, immediacy, and repetition, appear to cover all of Pennebaker’s categories and 
provide scope for taking measurements from verbal artefacts. In contrast, Burgoon’s 
group have 45 cues in 8 categories, with 20 shared with DePaulo, but some of which 
are variously elaborated, expanded, and contracted, elsewhere (Burgoon & Qin, 2006; 
Qin et al. 2005; Zhou et al. 2004; Zhou, Burgoon & Twitchell, 2003; Zhou et al. 
2003; Burgoon et al. 2003). Burgoon’s categories are:  
1. Quantity (syllables, word, sentence, verbs, simple sentences, noun phrase) 
2. Complexity (big words, syllables per word, short sentences, long sentences, avg. 
clauses, avg. length of noun phrase, flesh-kincaid grade level, syntactic 
complexity, sentence complexity, conjunctions, lexical complexity, pausality) 
3. Diversity (lexical diversity, content word diversity, redundancy) 
4. Specificity (sensory details, modifiers, first-person singular/ plural pronouns, 
second/third person pronouns, temporal and spatial details, Over all specificity, 
perceptual information) 
5. Affect (affect, pleasantness, imagery, positive and negative affects) 
6. Activation (emotiveness index , activation,) 
7. Verbal non-immediacy (passive voice, reference, modal verbs, uncertainty, 
objectification, generalizing term) 
8. Informality (typo errors) 
It is unclear whether Burgoon’s set of cues are comprehensive and fixed, and related 
publications offer up those that are relevant to the specific research being presented, 
or whether they can be added to, deleted from, or move to other categories as appears 
to have happened within his publications.  
 
4 Relating Ethics and Deception 
Knowing certain important characteristics of deception, is it ethical to deceive? 
Although we do not aim at comprehensive treatment of the ethics of deception, 
perspectives offered by ethical theories are still interesting.  
Deontology, and here we may specialise to Kantianism, emphasizes the goodness of 
rules. An absolute duty not to be deceptive would not consider whether the deception 
is well-intentioned. If somebody asks where your friend is because they want to harm 
him, and you point in the opposite direction, you have deceived but you have not lied 
because you have not verbalised the action1. From this perspective, Erat and Gneezy’s 
(2009) classification would be entirely unacceptable. Consequentialists and 
Utilitarians, on the other hand, would tend towards agreement with Erat and Gneezy’s 
classification as utility (happiness and benefits) is considered - with Pareto White Lies 
appearing to offer the best option. So, deception may offer a better alternative except 
in relation to “Spite Black Lies”. Prima Facie Duty (Ross, 1930; Garrett, 2004) 
includes Fidelity, which requires avoiding deception unless other duties are more 
pressing – in which case, deception may be acceptable. This consideration of Erat and 
Gneezy’s (2009) classification suggests that deceptions of various kinds can be 
readily acceptable – but not by Kantianism.  
4.1 Characterising deceptive acts 
How might we characterise examples of deception with respect both to Erat & 
Gneezy (2009), and ethical theories? We offer a few examples here. 
Placebos: Those given placebos them are not likely to be told, so the deception is not 
verbalised: Sherman and Hichner’s (2008) study shows that although 45% of clinical 
practice involves some kind of placebo, only 4% of the patients are informed. Doctors 
are participating in an act of deception that benefits both themselves and their 
patients, increasing the total happiness. This suggests a “Pareto White Lies”, 
acceptable by consequentialists and utilitarians.  
Online dating: In exploring an online dating website, it was apparent that certain 
profiles evidenced various kinds of deceptions geared towards convincing others to 
become interested in them without knowing the reality from the beginning - “Selfish 
Black Lies”. Depending on severity and over-riding duties, some might agree with 
such behaviour. Figure 2, below, shows an example of potential deception in an 
online dating website. A user appears to have created two different profiles – the 
image has been mirrored, and the wall adornments appear to offer good confirmation 
of this, but variations in nationality and height (either a 5cm growth or shrinkage has 
been experienced within a 1 year period by this person – age is the same for each – or 
there is some preference for height being played to that depends on national 
preferences). Unfortunately, examples of such an attempt to deceive are frequent but 
only a comprehensive analysis of the database could pick out all cases of it.  
 Figure 2: Example of verbal and image deception in online dating websites 
Surveys which make headlines about “Coffee causing Hallucinations” with no 
medical evidence and very little scientific rigour might also be characterised as 
“Selfish Black Lies”. Plagiarism might also be an example of “Selfish Black Lies”, 
where the sender intends to deceive another into believing knowledge or work he/she 
does not own. But, then, what if researchers offer references to a work that does not 
exist, believing that it does? (Dubin, 2004) 
Financial practices: Companies which collapsed due to deceptive financial practices 
(e.g. Enron, WorldCom), and difficulties relating to the so-called “credit crunch”, may 
have initially been conceived as “Selfish Black Lies”. However, those responsible 
may not have emerged unscathed – though from the credit crunch, some appear to 
have escaped rather better than others – from what now appears to be “Spite Black 
Lies”. Utility is not increased, and so the only remaining mitigation would relate to 
duties more pressing than Fidelity.  
Examples of "Altruistic white lies" can be seen in familiars and friends who care for 
each other where someone deceives the other to believe in something because they 
would like to protect time emotionally or physically; just like pretending to enjoy a 
meal. 
5 Deception detection – a system? 
Given the extent of research on verbal deception, are we able to use this to good 
effect? We have tried to ascertain the potential for extant research on verbal deception 
to lead to a Web Filter. Such a filter should flag deceptive material, whilst allowing 
non-deceptive material to pass through – low numbers of false positives should be 
generated. 
 Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of proportion of “big words” according to LIWC on 100 
MuchMore scientific abstracts (some results omitted), showing a distribution rather higher than 
that indicated. 
 
In Burgoon’s research, neither the cues nor the threshold values for the cues are 
stable. For example, in Zhou et al. (2004) number of words, sentences and 
emotiveness index are shown to increase in cases of deception, but in Burgoon et al. 
(2003) and Zhou et al. (2003) all three are shown to decrease. Similar inconsistencies 
can be seen across their papers for cues relating to first person singular, perceptual 
information, positive affects, redundancy, modal verbs and uncertainty. To implement 
a system capable of weighting its own parameters would prove to be a challenge, and 
further work will be needed to unpick these inconsistencies. 
Pennebaker’s group offer a free trial version of the “Linguistic Inquiry and Word 
Count (LWIC)” software online. It is claimed that LIWC can flag deceptive text on 
any sort (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2009). We have tested the online version using 100 
articles (scientific abstracts) from the MuchMore Springer English Corpus (plain 
version)2, which we have no reason to believe are deceptive. Figure 3 shows the 
frequencies obtained only for “big words”, which – if we interpret LIWC correctly – 
may be indicating that all these texts are deceptive. A threshold for “formal” of 19.6 is 
suggested by LIWC, presumably indicating an acceptable percentage of big words. 
These abstracts have an average of 36.15 (55.26 max, 21.15 min – all texts above 
19.6). With few self-references, few positive or negative emotions, and fewer articles 
(e.g. determiners) than expected, additional efforts will be required in interpreting 
these results appropriately to avoid all such text being flagged as a false positive. 
Keila & Skillicorn (2005b) have apparently adopted concepts from LIWC, yet they 
tried to use SVD to – according to their abstract - determine a distinction in language 
use by those involved with criminal activities at Enron (using the Enron email 
corpus). However, the paper does not appear to elaborate this claim further. We have 
used the same approach (in R), and agree with their conclusions that they can 
differentiate between long and short emails, but it is unclear what relationship this 
bears to criminality, and hence it would not appear appropriate for system 
development.   
To date, despite all of the well-grounded research undertaken by those for whom we 
must have great respect, it would seem that the development of a Web Filter for 
deception is going to be a significant challenge indeed.   
6 Conclusions 
Deception is a reasonably common part of daily life and the Web offers many new 
opportunities to make it more so. Characteristics of the Web, and related technologies, 
such as asynchronicity and distribution can offer the right kind of environment for this 
to propagate without detection.  With this in mind, we reviewed deception research, 
looking in part at ways it might be detected, and relating it to the ethics of deception. 
We considered whether extant approaches might offer the potential for the 
development of a Web Filter for deception, but have yet to discover a fixed set of 
deception cues with well-understood thresholds which might be applied to this. It is 
possible that many of the results claimed in literature depend entirely on the 
researcher and their cues, and also on the context of the research; these might not 
extrapolate across text types, genres, and so on. Whilst searching for text corpora 
upon which to evaluate extant deception approaches in the week prior to submission 
of this full paper, we discovered Potts’ (2010) course material on deception. We are 
encouraged by the fact that our work is proceeding along related lines, with some of 
the same core references, although there are clear points of deviation which will 
doubtless be clarified in time. 
 
Elsewhere, researchers are building intelligent systems that use the Web as the main 
source of information3. However, if humans don’t have a good ability to detect 
deception, can’t agree on the cues of deception, and have differences of opinion on 
how deception might be detected, how could we possibly craft such systems and rely 
on their outputs? Alternatively, what happens if we deliberately create intelligent 
machines to deceive (Arkin, 2010), could we detect them? How would we prevent 
them? Should we be able to?  
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 Kant can probably be extended to allow for such a broader interpretation than examples with 
which he is typically identified. 
2
 MuchMore Springer Bilingual Corpus, available at: http://muchmore.dfki.de/resources1.htm 
3
 Examples can be seen at: http://wikipediavandalism.tumblr.com/ 
